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Loss-Chasing, Alexithymia, and
Impulsivity in a Gambling Task:
Alexithymia as a Precursor to
Loss-Chasing Behavior When
Gambling
Peter A. Bibby*
School of Psychology, The University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Objective: To examine the relationship between loss-chasing, the propensity to
continue gambling to recover from losses, alexithymia, a personality trait associated poor
emotional processing and impulsivity, the tendency to act quickly without reflection or
consideration of the consequences.
Method: Two experiments are reported (E1: N = 60, Males, 11; Age, 21.6 years. E2:
N = 49, Males, 22; Age, 21.1 years). In experiment 1, two groups (low alexithymia, high
alexithymia) completed the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT). Loss-chasing behavior was
investigated. In experiment 2, both alexithymia (low, high) and impulsivity (low, high) were
examined also using the CGT. A further change was the order of bet proportion from
ascending to descending.
Results: Experiment 1 shows loss-chasing behavior in participants high in alexithymia
but not those low in alexithymia ( 2η =p 0.09). Experiment 2 shows loss-chasing behavior
in participants both low and high in alexithymia but it was greater for participants
high in alexithymia ( 2η =p 0.09). The effect of impulsivity was not statistically significant
( 2η =p 0.01). Loss-chasing behavior was correlated with the emotional facets of
alexithymia but not the cognitive facet.
Conclusions: Alexithymia is a precursor to loss-chasing when gambling and
loss-chasing reflects the cognitive and emotional aspects of gambling. Specifically, the
tendency to loss-chase depends on the need to recoup previous losses and failure to
process the emotional consequences of those losses.
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INTRODUCTION
For the vast majority of people, gambling is a form of entertainment, occasionally indulged at a
minimum cost (e.g., lottery players). The British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010 (Wardle et al.,
2011) surveyed 7756 individuals and found that in the last year the number of times people played
the National Lottery was 3.2, slot machines was 5.6, and horse races was 5.0. However, for a small
group of individuals gambling is a serious problem with negative consequences for the individual,
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their family, and society as a whole. The percentage of the
population who are problem gamblers varies from 0.3 (Sweden)
to 5.0% (Hong Kong) with the UK near the median at 0.9%
(Wardle et al., 2011). Though these percentages seem small the
number of problem gamblers is large. TheUK estimate is between
a quarter and half a million people (Wardle et al., 2011). Given
the prevalence of problem gambling it is important to examine
the mechanisms both distal (e.g., personality traits) and proximal
(e.g., loss-chasing behavior) that lead to problem gambling.
This paper examines two personality traits, alexithymia and
impulsivity, and a key feature of problem gambling, loss-chasing
behavior.
Loss-Chasing and Personality
The DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association, Fourth Edition) criteria for problem
gambling includes “chasing” one’s losses, that is continuing to
gamble, often with increasing bet size, to recover from losses.
This phenomenon is common among problem gamblers andmay
be the most significant step on the road to problem gambling
(Lesieur, 1979; Dickerson et al., 1987; Corless and Dickerson,
1989; O’Connor and Dickerson, 2003). Toce-Gerstein et al.
(2003) found that more than 75% of problem gamblers reported
chasing losses and 59.6% of all gamblers chased. They also found
that chasing losses occurred even when other commonly cited
indicators of problem gambling did not.
Breen and Zuckerman (1999) point out that the common
view of chasing involves returning on a later day. However,
continuing to gamble maladaptively by chasing within a single
gambling session is highly likely to be a contributing factor in the
development of the between session chasing behavior. It is this
kind of “chasing” that is also the focus of the current paper.
Breen and Zuckerman (1999) examined within session
“chasing.” In their experiment, chasers were defined as those
participants who continued to play a gambling game until they
had lost all their money. The game was designed so that losing
all the money was an inevitable consequence on continuing
to play. Out of 203 participants 70 (34%) were categorized as
chasers. The only personality measure that showed a significant
difference between players who chased and those who did not
was impulsive sensation seeking. They argued that this reflects
a difference in sensitivity to rewards and punishments (c.f.,
Gray and McNaughton, 2000) with punishments being relatively
ineffective in reducing loss-chasing.
A study by Linnet et al. (2006) examined problem gamblers
and non-problem gamblers in the context of the Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994). They found that problem
gamblers showed evidence of more loss-chasing than non-
problem gamblers. Problem gamblers, they argued do not notice
their chasing behavior. This is consistent with the idea of
hyposensitivity to losses. You may not notice that you are
throwing good money after bad if you have not noticed it is bad.
Kim and Lee (2011) examined the influence of the Behavioral
Approach System and Behavioral Inhibition System on decision
making in a simple gambling task. This task allowed Kim
and Lee (2011) to examine behavior after wins and losses.
They found that the combination of high behavioral approach
and low behavior inhibition was associated with more risky
decisions after a win but the combination of low behavioral
approach and high behavioral inhibition was related to fewer
non-risky decisions after losses. They hypothesized that the
experience of losses facilitates the inhibitory behavior, suggesting
an increased sensitivity to losses. Kim and Lee (2011) suggest that
further research is required to examine the relationship between
personality traits and loss-chasing behavior.
Alexithymia and Problem Gambling
Alexithmyia is a stable personality trait associated with the
processing of emotional information (Taylor et al., 1997). The
key features of alexithymia have been identified as difficulty
identifying feelings (DIF), difficulty describing feelings (DDF),
and externally oriented thinking (EOT; Parker et al., 1993, 2008;
Bagby et al., 1994, 2007, 2009). Essentially, a person high in
alexithymia finds making sense of their own and other people’s
emotions difficult. As a consequence they tend to focus on
external rather than internal causes for behavior.
Alexithymia is related to problem gambling (Lumley and
Roby, 1995; Parker et al., 2005; Toplak et al., 2007; Bonnaire
et al., 2009; Ferguson et al., 2009; Mitrovic and Brown, 2009).
Lumley and Roby (1995) used the South Oaks Gambling Screen
(SOGS; Lesieur and Blume, 1987) and Toronto Alexithymia Scale
(TAS-20; Taylor et al., 1985) to examine the relationship between
alexithymia and problem gambling. Of the 1100 American
university students, 3.1% were identified as problem gamblers
using the SOGS criteria. Of these, 34% were identified as
alexithymic (a high degree of alexithymia) whereas only 11.1%
of the non-problem gamblers were so classified. Parker et al.
(2005), using the revised Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20,
Parker et al., 1993) and SOGS, found that 22% of the pathological
gamblers were alexithymic whereas only 11% of the non-problem
gamblers were alexithymic. Though Bonnaire et al. (2009) only
examined pathological gamblers they found that 44% were
identified as alexithymic. Parker et al. (2008) found a 10%
incidence of alexithymia in a community sample (n = 1933)
and an 11% incidence in an undergraduate sample (n = 1948).
Thus, an incidence of 44%, as observed by Bonnaire et al. (2009)
is greater than would be expected.
Alexithymia and Loss Chasing
There are two areas of research that suggest that there is a
link between the alexithymia and loss-chasing. First, it has been
suggested that people who are high in alexithymia have difficulty
processing information about losses (Ferguson et al., 2009; Bibby
and Ferguson, 2011) and second, the neurological structures
implicated in loss-chasing (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2008)
show clear differences in alexithymic and non-alexithymic
individuals (Lane et al., 1998; Berthoz et al., 2002; Kano et al.,
2003, 2007; Mantani et al., 2005; Moriguchi et al., 2006).
Ferguson et al. (2009) examined the behavior of people
scoring low and high on the TAS-20 when completing the
IGT. They found that the rate at which participants high
in alexithymia learned was slower. Furthermore, alexithymic
participants returned to deck B significantly more often than
expected by chance, whereas non-alexithymic participants did
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not. Deck B has been identified as being distinct from the other
decks (Lin et al., 2007). The schedule of rewards for Deck B is
that on each trial (in a block of 10 trials) there is a relatively
high gain and only one single, catastrophic loss. Ferguson et al.
(2009) suggest that the willingness to return to deck B indicates
that participants high in alexithymia are less sensitive to losses.
Bibby and Ferguson (2011) followed up this suggestion and
examined the relationship between loss aversion and alexithymia.
They found that alexithymia was associated with loss aversion
in both a riskless and a risky task. For the riskless task, higher
alexithymia was associated with a smaller endowment effect
(Kahneman et al., 1990), indicating less loss aversion. For the
risky task, a simple lottery, higher alexithymia was associated
with a willingness to accept higher potential financial losses. This
tendency to less loss aversion remained even when sex, the Big
5 personality variables and sensation seeking were statistically
controlled.
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. (2008) found loss-chasing was
associated with increased activity with the ventro-medial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the subgenual anterior cingulate
cortex (sgACC), but the decision not to loss-chase was associated
with increased activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(dACC), the ventral striatum and the anterior insula cortices.
Kugel et al. (2008) found a relatively strong negative correlation
between TAS-20 scores and right amygdala activation when
processing emotional facial expressions. Lane et al. (1998),
Berthoz et al. (2002), Kano et al. (2003) all found reduced activity
in the anterior cingulate cortex for alexithymics when processing
emotional information. Mantani et al. (2005) reduced activity in
the posterior cingulate cortex when alexithymics were asked to
imagine past and future happy, sad and neutral events. Kano
et al. (2003) also found an association between alexithymia and
reduced activity in the anterior insular cortex. Both Kano et al.
(2003) and Moriguchi et al. (2006) found reduced activity in
alexithymics when processing emotional information in the pre-
frontal cortex.
Given that alexithymia is associated with problem gambling
and problem gambling is associated with loss-chasing and that
activity in several of the same brain regions is associated with
both loss-chasing and alexithymia it seems realistic to predict
a relationship between between alexithymia and loss chasing
in gambling. Experiment 1 uses a simple gambling task, the
Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 1999) to test the
prediction that higher alexithymia is associated with greater loss-
chasing. It is predicted that participants high in alexithymia will
bet more after a loss than after a win and will do so more than
people low in Alexithymia.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Sixty undergraduate student volunteers participated in the
experiment (49 female, 11 male). The average age was 21.6 years.
Participants were informed that there were monetary prizes of
£25, £15, and £10 to be awarded for the three highest scores.
Using a cut off point of ≤51 on the TAS-20 (Taylor et al., 1997),
42 participants were identified as non-alexithymic (36 female,
6 male) with the remaining participants at or near caseness for
alexithymia (13 female, 5 male). This equates to the finding that
approximately 30% of people in the general population score 52
or above on the TAS-20 (Parker et al., 2008). The chi square test of
sex by alexithymia group was not significant [χ2(1)= 1.532, p =
0.216]. The means and standard deviations of the alexithymia
scores by sex and alexithymia group are shown in Table 1. As
expected a 2× 2 (sex by alexithymia) between groups analysis of
showed a significant main effect of alexithymia [F(1, 56) = 46.14,
MSe = 23.913, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.61] with the non-alexithymic
group scoring lower than the at or near caseness group. There
was no effect of sex [F(1, 56) = 0.63, MSe = 23.913, p = 0.41,
η
2
p = 0.01]. The interaction was also not significant [F(1, 56) =
0.10, MSe = 23.913, p = 0.75, η2p < 0.01]. Given that there is no
evidence that sex is related to alexithymia in this sample sex was
not included in the analyses that follow in the Results section.
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20)
Alexithymia was assessed using the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia
Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994). The TAS-20 is a self-report
measure of alexithymia that includes 20 items that divide into
three factors; DIF, difficulties in describing feelings (DDF), and
EOT. Each item is responded to on a 1–5 point Likert Type
scale with 1 representing strong disagreement and 5 representing
strong agreement with higher total scores indicating higher
alexithymia. Taylor et al. (1997) suggest a cut-off point of 52 on
the scale as at or near caseness for a diagnosis of alexithymia.
Cambridge Gambling Task
An adapted version of the CGT (Rogers et al., 1999; see Figure 1)
was used. In this task 10 boxes are displayed at the top of the
program window. Ordered from left to right a number of boxes
are shown in red or blue. On each trial the number of red boxes
randomly varies between one and nine with an equal likelihood
of each of the nine outcomes. The participant was told that the
computer had randomly hidden a yellow token inside one of the
boxes. The actual placement of the yellow token was randomly
varied on each trial between boxes 1 and 10 with an equal
likelihood of each box. The participant was told that they had to
decide which color box, either RED or BLUE, the yellow token
was hidden inside. She/he made this decision by clicking on the
buttons shown at the bottom of the screen (RED or BLUE). To
the left of these buttons is a field that shows the amount of points
available to bet. This stake was incremented with any wins and
decremented by losses. If at any time the stake fell below 200
points it was automatically increased back to 200 points and the
computer informed participants that this had happened.
TABLE 1 | Mean (and standard deviations) of the TAS-20 scores for sex by
alexithymia group.
Female Male
Non-alexithymic 41.47 (5.11) 43.33 (5.01)
At or near caseness 58.00 (4.02) 58.80 (5.12)
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FIGURE 1 | The Cambridge Gambling Task program windows
immediately before a bet is made (top, BLUE selected) and
immediately after a bet is made (bottom).
To the right of the bottom of the program window is another
field which shows the actual bet to be made. The value shown in
this field increments upwards in 10% steps at 1 s intervals until
90% of the available stake is shown. If a participant waited too
long at the 90% step the computer cycled back round to 10%
and incremented upwards in 10% steps again. The actual amount
shown had a randomly generated amount of positive/negative
error (up to 10% of the 10% step) to mask that it was in 10%
steps. Below this field is a button that states “BET NOW.” When
a participant clicked on this button the amount displayed in
the field above was bet. Immediately following this selection
the position of the yellow token was displayed in one of the
boxes at the top of the program window and 2 s later, a message
was shown stating either “You Win!” or “You Lose!” If the
participant selected the correct color (e.g., she/he selected RED
and the yellow ball was in a red box) then the available stake
was increased by the amount bet. If the selection was incorrect
(e.g., she/he selected RED but the yellow ball was in blue box)
then the available stake was decreased by the amount bet. The
example in the top of Figure 1 shows that the participant bet
105 out of 200 points having selected BLUE. The bottom of
Figure 1 shows that the yellow ball was in a blue box and the 105
points won where transferred to the field indicating the available
stake.
TABLE 2 | Means (and standard errors) of the proportion bet for the
alexithymia groups by the probability of winning.
Probability of winning
p = 0.5 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 p = 0.9
Non-alexithymic 0.13 (0.02) 0.18 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02) 0.37 (0.03)
At or near
caseness
0.15 (0.03) 0.18 (0.03) 0.23 (0.03) 0.28 (0.04) 0.36 (0.05)
Each participant was told that there was a monetary reward
associated with their performance. Further, that the participants
scoring the top three scores in the game would win prizes of £25,
£15, and £10, respectively. After 10 practice trials (with no betting
involved), the participant played the gambling task (with betting)
for 100 trials. Once the trials were completed the participant was
debriefed and thanked for her/his participation. When all the
data had been collected the participants who scored one of the
top three scores where contacted and given the appropriate prize
money.
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the School of Psychology, University
of Nottingham Ethics committee with written informed consent
from all participants. All participants gave written informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Results
Overall, the total number of points scores across the participants
was positively skewed thus the total number of points was
logarithm (base 10) transformed. A t-test to examine whether the
non-alexithymic (mean = 8.60 × 107) and alexithymic (mean =
1.03× 108) participants differed in total score was not significant
(t58 = −0.16, p = 0.87, d = 0.32).
To test whether participants gambled a proportion of the
available stake in line with the likelihood of winning on any
particular trial a 2× 5 mixed analysis of variance was conducted
on the proportion bet. The means and standard errors are found
in Table 2. The first variable was alexithymia group (between
groups) and the second was probability of winning (within
groups) on each trial1 (p = 0.5, p = 0.6, p = 0.7, p = 0.8,
p = 0.9). The effect of alexithymia was not significant [F(1, 58)<
0.01, MSe = 0.08, p = 0.96, η2p < 0.01]. The effect of probability
of winning was significant [F(1.58, 91.35) = 55.49, MSe = 0.02,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.49]. The interaction between alexithymia and
probability of winning was also not significant [F(1.58, 91.35) =
0.15,MSe= 0.02, p = 0.96, η2p < 0.01].
To test whether participants engaged in loss-chasing a 2
(alexithymia: high vs. low) × 2 (previous trial: win vs. loss) ×
5 (p of winning on each trial p = 0.5, p = 0.6, p = 0.7,
p = 0.8, p = 0.9) mixed analysis of variance was conducted on
the proportion bet. The means and standard errors are shown
in Table 3. The number of participants included in this analysis
fell to 57. This was because three participants had missing
values. This is in part due to the random generation of the
1Throughout the paper, F statistics including this variable were Greenhouse and
Geisser corrected to take account of the failure to meet the sphericity assumption.
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TABLE 3 | Means (and standard errors) of the proportion bet for the alexithymia groups by outcome of the previous trial and probability of winning on the
current trial.
Alexithymia Previous trial Probability of winning
p = 0.5 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 p = 0.9
Non-alexithymia Won 0.12 (0.02) 0.17 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02) 0.27 (0.03) 0.35 (0.03)
Lost 0.14 (0.03) 0.18 (0.02) 0.22 (0.03) 0.29 (0.03) 0.36 (0.04)
At or near caseness Won 0.13 (0.03) 0.19 (0.03) 0.20 (0.03) 0.27 (0.04) 0.34 (0.05)
Lost 0.19 (0.04) 0.19 (0.03) 0.27 (0.04) 0.28 (0.04) 0.42 (0.05)
trials interacting with participant choices such that for these
participants a specific combination of won or lost at the five levels
of winning probability did not occur.
Themain effects of previous trial [F(1, 55) = 19.21,MSe< 0.01,
p=<0.01, η2p < 0.26] and probability of winning [F(1.83, 100.52) =
46.14, MSe = 0.04, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.46] were both significant
but the main effect of alexithymia was not [F(1, 55) = 0.18,
MSe = 0.17, p = 0.68, η2p < 0.01]. Overall, participants bet a
greater proportion of the available stake after they had lost on a
previous trial (mean = 0.26) than won (mean = 0.23). Overall
as the probability of winning increased participants bet a larger
proportion of the available stake (p0.5 = 0.15, p0.6 = 0.18,
p0.7 = 0.23, p0.8 = 0.28, p0.9 = 0.37).
The two-way interaction between alexithymia and previous
trial was significant [F(1, 55) = 5.50, MSe < 0.01, p = 0.02, η
2
p =
0.09; see Figure 2]. Neither the two-way interaction between
alexithymia and probability of winning [F(1.83, 100.52) = 46.14,
MSe = 0.04, p = 0.77, η2p < 0.01] nor that between previous
trial and probability of winning [F(3.38, 185.96) = 1.55, MSe <
0.01, p = 0.20, η2p = 0.03] were significant. Finally, the three-way
interaction between alexithymia, previous trial and probability of
winning was not significant [F(3.38, 185.96) = 2.32, MSe < 0.01,
p = 0.06, η2p = 0.040].
The simple effects of the two-way interaction between
alexithymia and previous trial showed that there was no
significant difference in proportion bet between the alexithymia
groups when the previous trial was won (p = 0.99) or lost (p =
0.44). For the non-alexithymia group there was no difference
between the proportion bet for wins and losses (p = 0.08),
however, there was for the group at or near caseness (p <
0.01). For the three-way interaction the key finding of the simple
effects analysis is that for the non-alexithymic group there are no
significant differences in the proportion bet whether the previous
trial was a win or loss at any probability of winning. On the other
hand, for the at or near caseness group there were significant
differences in the proportion bet after a win or a loss at the
p = 0.5 (p = 0.02), p = 0.7 (p < 0.01), and p = 0.9 (p < 0.01)
levels of winning probability.
Discussion
The results showed both low and high alexithymia participants
bet a proportion of the available stake that increased linearly
with the probability of winning. It seems likely then that both
groups understood the nature of the task and behaved in a
rational manner with respect to the task—bet more when the
FIGURE 2 | The proportion bet (means and standard errors) for the
alexithymia groups having won or lost on the previous trial.
odds of winning are greater. With respect to loss-chasing the
important finding is that those low in alexithymia showed no
evidence of betting more after a loss (22.6% of the available stake)
than after a win (23.9%). In other words, the amount they bet
overall was apparently independent of their prior experience of
winning or losing. However, participants high in alexithymia (at
or near caseness) showed a loss-chasing effect. After a win they
bet 22.7%, an almost identical proportion as the non-alexithymic
participants. However, they bet significantly more, 27.0%, after a
loss. In other words, they chased their losses.
Unlike previous research, there is no evidence that those low
in alexithymia chased losses. This could reflect the fact that
these participants on average rarely bet more than 40% of their
available stake, even though the probability of winning could be
as high as p = 0.9. Thus, a catastrophic loss, with the ensuing
need to regain the points as quickly as possible to maximize the
overall score, generally did not happen. It is possible that if the
amount lost was increased then participants low in alexithymia
may loss-chase (in terms of the amount bet). Similarly, even
though there is evidence of loss-chasing for participants high
in alexithymia, the effect is relatively small (d = 0.27). In fact,
the finding that there was no significant difference between low
and high alexithymia groups on the overall score (two prizes
were won by low alexithymia scorers and one prize by a high
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alexithymia scorer) suggests that in this task, at least, loss-chasing
does not lead to a spiral of further loss-chasing.
To mimic the kind of serious loss that might facilitate loss-
chasing it was decided to modify the experiment such that
participants were initially offered high bets, decreasing with
time. This may produce the type of deep losses that would
provoke further loss-chasing. However, it does introduce a
further possible explanation, impulsivity. If participants are high
in impulsivity they may find it difficult to wait sufficiently long
to reach the lower stake bets. Impulsivity has been shown to
be related to both problem gambling (Blaszczynski et al., 1997;
Steel and Blaszczynski, 1998; Vitaro et al., 1999, 2004; Alessi and
Petry, 2003; MacLaren et al., 2011) and alexithymia (Gustavsson
et al., 2003; Zimmermann et al., 2005; Gunnarsson et al., 2008;
Wickens et al., 2008; Shishido et al., 2013). Given that impulsivity
is related to both, it is necessary to take into account the affect
that impulsivity could have on loss-chasing.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to extend the findings of the first
experiment. It is predicted that by increasing the likelihood of
a large possible loss by increasing the initial bet value to 90% of
the available stake, both low and high alexithymia participants
will demonstrate loss-chasing behaviors but it will be greater for
the high alexithymia participants. Furthermore, it is predicted
that high impulsivity participants will be more likely to loss-
chase, as they will be more likely to find themselves in the
position of making larger losses. Finally, it is hypothesized that
the combination of high alexithymia and high impulsivity will be
particularly toxic for loss-chasing and likely to boost loss-chasing
behavior.
Method
Participants
Initially 176 university undergraduates were asked to complete
both the TAS-20 and the BIS-11 Scales. These participants were
not paid for their participants but they were asked whether
if contacted later they would be willing to participate in a
further experiment in which they had the opportunity to win
a monetary prize. A computer program then selected randomly
(using a constraint-based iterative algorithm) participants to be
contacted for participation in the experiment. Four lists of 20
participants to be contacted were generated, crossing higher and
lower alexithymia with higher and lower impulsivity as measured
by the TAS-20 and BIS-11 scales, respectively. The program
constraints meant that the means and standard deviations of the
TAS-20 scores for the lower TAS-20 contact lists were the same
for the lower and higher BIS-11 contact lists. The same applied to
the higher TAS-20 contact list. Similarly, the means and standard
deviations of the BIS-11 scores for the lower BIS-11 contact lists
were the same for the lower and higher TAS-20 contact lists.
As before, the same applied to the higher BIS-11 contact list. A
final constraint was that an equal numbers of males and females
were included in each group. These 80 participants were then
contacted and asked to participate in the experiment. They were
told that there were monetary prizes of £25, £15, and £10 to be
awarded for the three highest scores.
A total of 49 participants replied. The cell sizes were 11, 12,
13, and 13 for the four groups of low/high TAS-20 by low/high
BIS-11. The number of males and females in each group was not
significantly different, with a total of 27 females and 22 males
participating. The average age of the participants was 21.1 years.
Overall (seeTable 4), for the TAS-20 scores there was a significant
difference between low and high TAS-20 scorers on the TAS-
20 but not on the BIS-11. Similarly, there was a significant
difference between the low and high BIS-11 scorers on the BIS-
11 but no difference for these groups on the TAS-20. No other
significant differences were found. For the high TAS-20 group
of participants all the participants met the criteria for at or near
caseness (Taylor et al., 1997).
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20)
The details are the same as in Experiment 1.
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, version 11 (BIS-11; Patton
et al., 1995) is a 30 item self-report questionnaire assessing
impulsiveness. It is constructed on the basis of six first
order impulsiveness factors (attention—“I don’t ‘pay attention,”’
cognitive instability—“I often have extraneous thoughts when
thinking,” motor—“I do things without thinking,” perseverance—
“I can only think about one thing at a time,” self-control—“I plan
task carefully” and cognitive complexity—“I like puzzles”). The
items are scored on a scale from 1 (Rarely/Never) to 4 (Almost
Always/Always) with a higher total score associated with higher
impulsivity (once reversed items are accounted for).
Cambridge Gambling Task
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 with one
exception. In the first experiment the amount available to bet
increased in 10% steps (one step per second). In this experiment,
the amount available to bet decreases in 10% steps from 90%.
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the School of Psychology, University
of Nottingham Ethics committee with written informed consent
from all participants. All participants gave written informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Results
As in the previous experiment, the total number of points scored
was significantly skewed so the data was logarithm (base 10)
transformed. A 2 (alexithymia: high vs. low) × 2 (impulsivity:
TABLE 4 | Means (and standard errors) of the TAS-20 and BIS-11 scores
for the alexithymia by impulsivity groups.
TAS-20 scores BIS-11 scores
Low TAS-20 Low BIS-11 (N = 11) 40.46 (2.21) 62.36 (2.02)
High BIS-11 (N = 13) 42.92 (2.04) 81.00 (1.86)
High TAS-20 Low BIS-11 (N = 13) 62.39 (2.04) 60.92 (1.86)
High BIS-11 (N = 12) 57.42 (2.12) 84.92 (1.93)
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high vs. low) between groups analysis was then conducted on
the logarithm transformed scores with the first variable being
alexithymia and the second impulsivity (see Table 5 for the
means and standard errors).
There was no significant effect for TAS-20 group [F(1, 45) =
0.82, MSe = 5.01, p = 0.37, η2p = 0.02], nor BIS-11 group
[F(1, 45) = 2.21,MSe= 5.01, p = 0.14, η
2
p = 0.05]. There was also
no significant interaction between TAS-20 and BIS-11 groups
[F(1, 45) = 3.51,MSe= 5.01, p = 0.07, η
2
p = 0.02].
To establish whether participants were behaving rationally
with respect to the probability of winning a 2 (alexithymia) ×
2 (impulsivity) × 5 (probability of winning) analysis of variance
was conducted on the proportion of the available stake that was
bet (see Table 6 for the means and standard errors). The only
main effect that was significant was that of the probability of
winning [F(1.94, 87.16) = 64.63, MSe = 0.02, p < 0.01, η
2
p =
0.59], with neither alexithymia [F(1, 45) = 0.11, MSe = 0.18,
p = 0.74, η2p < 0.01] nor impulsivity [F(1, 45) = 0.59, MSe =
0.18, p = 0.45, η2p = 0.01] having significant effects. None of the
TABLE 5 | Means (and standard errors) of the total points scored for
alexithymia by impulsivity.
Lower BIS-11 Higher BIS-11
Lower TAS-20 4.83× 106 (3.94× 1010) 9.66× 109 (3.63× 1010)
Higher TAS-20 7.06× 1010 (3.63× 1010) 2.51× 108 (3.78× 1010)
two way interactions were significant [alexithymia× impulsivity:
F(1, 45) = 1.62, MSe = 0.18, p = 0.24, η
2
p = 0.04; alexithymia ×
probability of winning: F(1.94, 87.16) = 0.55,MSe= 0.02, p = 0.57,
η
2
p = 0.01; impulsivity × probability of winning: F(1.94, 87.16) =
0.09, MSe = 0.02, p = 0.91, η2p < 0.01]. Finally, the three-way
interaction was not significant [F(1.94, 87.16) = 0.14, MSe = 0.02,
p = 0.87, η2p < 0.01].
To test whether loss-chasing behavior was affected
by alexithymia and impulsivity, a 2 (alexithymia) × 2
(impulsivity) × 2 (previous trial) × 5 (probability of winning)
mixed analysis of variance was conducted on the proportion of
the stake that was bet. The means and standard errors are found
in Table 7.
Both the main effects of previous trial [F(1, 45) = 57.01,
MSe = 0.02, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.56] and probability of winning
[F(1.94, 87.16) = 0.14, MSe = 0.04, p < 0.01, η
2
p = 0.59] were
significant but neither alexithymia [F(1, 45) = 0.60, MSe = 0.20,
p = 0.44, η2p = 0.01] nor impulsivity [F(1, 45) = 0.61,MSe= 0.20,
p = 0.44, η2p = 0.01] were significant. Overall, participants bet
a larger proportion of the available stake after a loss (mean =
0.71) than a win (mean = 0.62). Furthermore, as the probability
of winning increased participants bet more (p0.5 = 0.51, p0.6 =
0.61, p0.7 = 0.65, p0.8 = 0.75, p0.9 = 0.80).
The two-way interaction between alexithymia and previous
trial [F(1, 45) = 4.54, MSe = 0.02, p = 0.04, η
2
p = 0.09; see
Figure 3] was significant; as was the interaction between previous
trial and the probability of winning [F(2.89, 130.06) = 3.85, MSe =
TABLE 6 | Means (and standard errors) of the proportion bet by alexithymia and impulsivity by probability of winning on the current trial.
Alexithymia Impulsivity Probability of winning
p = 0.5 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 p = 0.9
Lower Lower 0.54 (0.06) 0.62 (0.06) 0.68 (0.05) 0.76 (0.05) 0.82 (0.05)
Higher 0.46 (0.06) 0.53 (0.05) 0.57 (0.05) 0.67 (0.05) 0.75 (0.04)
Higher Lower 0.46 (0.06) 0.57 (0.05) 0.64 (0.05) 0.74 (0.05) 0.81 (0.04)
Higher 0.50 (0.06) 0.59 (0.05) 0.66 (0.05) 0.76 (0.05) 0.80 (0.04)
Overall 0.49 (0.03) 0.58 (0.03) 0.64 (0.026) 0.73 (0.02) 0.80 (0.02)
TABLE 7 | Means (and standard errors) of the proportion bet for alexithymia and impulsivity by outcome of the previous trial and probability of winning on
the current trial.
Alexithymia Impulsivity Previous trial Probability of winning
p = 0.5 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 p = 0.9
Lower Lower Won 0.50 (0.06) 0.60 (0.06) 0.66 (0.06) 0.73 (0.05) 0.82 (0.05)
Lost 0.52 (0.07) 0.65 (0.05) 0.70 (0.06) 0.80 (0.05) 0.83 (0.04)
Higher Won 0.45 (0.06) 0.48 (0.06) 0.54 (0.05) 0.65 (0.05) 0.74 (0.04)
Lost 0.46 (0.06) 0.65 (0.05) 0.65 (0.05) 0.72 (0.05) 0.80 (0.04)
Higher Lower Won 0.42 (0.06) 0.54 (0.06) 0.61 (0.05) 0.73 (0.05) 0.79 (0.04)
Lost 0.63 (0.06) 0.72 (0.05) 0.71 (0.05) 0.78 (0.05) 0.83 (0.04)
Higher Won 0.44 (0.06) 0.55 (0.06) 0.62 (0.05) 0.75 (0.05) 0.79 (0.05)
Lost 0.63 (0.06) 0.68 (0.05) 0.75 (0.06) 0.80 (0.05) 0.82 (0.04)
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FIGURE 3 | The means (and standard errors) of the proportion bet for
the alexithymia groups having won or lost on the previous trial.
0.01, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.08; see Figure 4]. The interactions
between alexithymia and impulsivity [F(1, 45) = 0.81, MSe =
0.20, p = 0.37, η2p = 0.02], alexithymia and probability of
winning [F(2.30, 103.40) = 0.22, MSe = 0.04, p = 0.93, η
2
p <
0.01], impulsivity and previous trial [F(1, 45) = 0.50,MSe = 0.02,
p = 0.48, η2p = 0.01], and impulsivity and probability winning
[F(2.30, 103.40) = 0.04, MSe = 0.04, p = 0.99, η
2
p < 0.01] were not
significant.
The simple effects for the two-way interaction between
alexithymia and previous trial showed that there was no
difference between the lower and higher alexithymia groups
when the previous trial was won (p = 0.87) but there was
when the previous trial was lost (p = 0.02). In this latter case,
participants higher in alexithymia bet proportionally more after
a loss than those lower in alexithymia. For the lower alexithymia
group there was a significant difference between having won or
lost on the previous trial (p < 0.01) as there was for the higher
alexithymia group (p < 0.01). In both cases, both the lower and
higher alexithymia participants bet proportionally more after a
loss than after a win.
For the two-way interaction between previous trial and
probability of winning, the simple effect show that there was a
significant different between when the previous trial was won or
lost at each level of level probability of winning on the current
trial (pmin = 0.02, pmax < 0.01). In each case, participants bet
significantly more after a loss than a win with the difference
between the two decreasing as the probability of winning on the
current trial increased.
The three-way interaction between alexithymia, previous trial,
and probability of winning [F(2.89, 130.60) = 3.50,MSe= 0.01, p =
0.01, η2p = 0.07; see Figure 5] was significant but the interactions
between alexithymia, impulsivity, and previous trial [F(1, 45) =
2.07,MSe = 0.02, p = 0.16, η2p = 0.04] and between impulsivity,
previous trial and probability of winning [F(2.89, 130.60) = 0.24,
MSe = 0.01, p = 0.86, η2p < 0.01] were not significant. Neither
was the four-way interaction between alexithymia, impulsivity,
previous trial, and probability of winning [F(2.89, 130.60) = 0.70,
MSe= 0.01, p = 0.55, η2p = 0.02].
The three-way interaction between alexithymia, previous trial
and probability of winning was further analyzed by examining
the two-way interaction between previous trial and probability
of winning separately for the lower and higher alexithymia
participants. For the lower alexithymia group this interaction
was not significant [F(2.48, 54.51) = 1.39, MSe = 0.02, p = 0.26,
η
2
p < 0.06], although both the main effects of previous trial and
probability of winning were significant. On the other hand, it
was significant for the higher alexithymia group [F(2.73, 62.70) =
7.04, MSe = 0.01, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.23]. A linear contrast for the
latter interaction was significant [F(1, 23) = 14.02, MSe = 0.02,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.37], indicating that the gradient of the trend, for
the proportion bet as the probability of winning rises to increase,
is different when the previous trial was won rather than lost. As
can be seen in Figure 5, when the previous trial was won the
proportion bet ranges from 0.43 (probability of winning is 0.5)
to 0.79 (probability of winning is 0.9), whereas it ranges from
0.63 (probability of winning is 0.5) to 0.83 (probability of winning
is 0.9) when the previous trial was lost. This represents a ceiling
effect for both groups (since the maximum available bet was 90%
of the available stake) which is reached at lower probabilities of
winning for the high alexithymia group.
Finally, to check that there was no confounding effect of sex
of participant all the analyses conducted so far for experiment 2
were conducted again this time replacing the impulsivity variable
with the sex of participant variable. For total points scored,
proportion bet on a trial for the current trial and proportion bet
on a trial after a previous win or loss there were no significant
main effects of sex or interactions between sex and the other
variables. At the same time, all the previously significant effects
remained statistically significant. Similarly, the previously non-
significant effects remained non-significant.
To explore which facet of alexithymia contributes most to the
difference in proportion bet depending on whether the previous
trial was won or lost, a difference score was calculated between
the proportion bet after a loss and the proportion bet after
a win for the five levels of the probability of winning. These
difference scores were then correlated with the three facets of the
TAS-20 alexithymia scale (see Table 8). Both DIF and difficulty
describing feeling (DDF) were positively correlated with the
lost/won difference score when the probability of winning was
0.5, and DIF was also significantly positively correlated when
the probability of winning was 0.6. EOT was not correlated with
any of the difference scores. It is possible that as the probability
of winning increases that any underlying correlation between
alexithymia and the difference scores is obscured since the
variability in the difference scores is simultaneously decreasing.
Discussion
By adapting the gambling task so that participants had to wait
for a shorter time to place larger bets the overall proportion
bet was substantially greater than in Experiment 1. Overall, in
Experiment 1 participants bet 24.0% (of the available stake) but
in Experiment 2 this increased to 64.4%. Participants bet more
than 2.5 times as much in Experiment 2 as in Experiment 1. All
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FIGURE 4 | The means (and standard errors) of the proportion bet for the outcome of the previous trial by the probability of winning on the current trial.
FIGURE 5 | The means (and standard errors) of the proportion bet for the outcome of the previous trial by the probability of winning on the current trial.
four groups of participants demonstrated a linear increase in the
mean proportion bet as the probability of winning increased. As
in Experiment 1 this suggests that all the participants understood
the task and behaved accordingly.
With respect to alexithymia and previous wins or losses, the
predicted interaction was observed. First, participants low in
alexithymia demonstrated loss-chasing betting more after a loss
(67.8%) than a win (61.7%; d = 0.43). At least part of loss-
chasing in this task reflects something other than alexithymia.
It is likely, that given the goal of maximizing the points won,
low alexithymia participants realized that a large loss needed to
be compensated and thus they gambled more than they might
otherwise. The participants who were high in alexithymia also
chased their losses; after a win they bet 62.4% but after a loss
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TABLE 8 | Correlations (means and standard errors) between the lost/won
difference scores at each level of probability of winning and the three
facets of alexithymia.
Probability of winning TAS-20 factors Mean (S.E.)
DIF DDF EOT
p = 0.5 0.34* 0.39** 0.18 0.14 (0.034)
p = 0.6 0.29* 0.17 0.17 0.11 (0.024)
p = 0.7 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.09 (0.017)
p = 0.8 0.11 0.07 −0.06 0.06 (0.014)
p = 0.9 −0.00 −0.03 −0.07 0.03 (0.14)
Mean (S.E.) 15.20 13.14 22.86
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. DIF, Difficulty Identifying Feelings; DDF, Difficulty Describing
Feelings; EOT, Externally Orienting Thinking.
73.4% (d = 0.79). The size of effect has increased by a factor
of 3 in comparison to Experiment 1 and is approximately twice
as large for the high alexithymia as for the low alexithymia
participants.
The three-way interaction between alexithymia, previous
trial, and probability of winning can be interpreted as a
ceiling effect that operates particular strongly for the high
alexithymia participants. For the low alexithymia participants
the loss-chasing effect was approximately the same size for all
probabilities of winning, approximately, 5.3%. However, for the
high alexithymia participants the loss-chasing effect diminishes
from 19.9% when the probability of winning was 0.5–3.6% when
the probability of winning was 0.9. This seems counterintuitive
given that usually it is a good idea to bet more as the likelihood of
winning increases. However, it is likely that this simply reflects
an artifactual ceiling effect. On average the maximum bet that
could be made was 90% of the available stake and after a loss
participants high in alexithymia bet on average 82.5%. It was not
actually possible for them to bet more than 100% of the available
stake which would be necessary for them to have a loss-chasing
effect the same size as when the probability of winning was 0.5.
The final alexithymia effects are the correlations between the
facets of alexithymia, DIF, DDF, and externally oriented thought.
Both DIF and DDF showed a significant positive correlation with
the average loss-chasing effect (i.e., proportion bet after a loss—
proportion bet after a win) but the EOT facet was not significant.
This suggests that it is the emotional and not the cognitive
component of alexithymia that is related to loss-chasing.
In terms of overall performance, that impulsivity showed no
effect on either the average amount bet or the average bet after
a winning or losing trial is striking. The predicted interaction
between alexithymia and impulsivity was not statistically
significant. One possible explanation for this failure to find any
impulsivity effects is that the participants selected were not really
impulsive. In a recent re-evaluation of the BIS-11 scale Stanford
et al. (2009) report a sample of 1577 adults who completed the
BIS-11. The mean BIS-11 score for these individuals was 62.3
(SD= 10.3). Both the lower and higher TAS-20, lower impulsivity
groups’ 95 and 99% confidence intervals for the mean include
this mean, indicating that these groups are scoring at reasonably
near the population mean. Neither of the lower and higher TAS-
20, higher impulsivity groups’ 95 and 99% confidence intervals
for the mean include 62.3. Of the 25 participants in the high
impulsivity groups all would be in the top 20% of Stanford et al.’s
(2009) sample, 21 would be in the top 10% and 13 in the top
5%. We can be reasonably certain that these latter groups are on
average significantly more impulsive than the general population.
It seems unlikely that not being impulsive is the issue.
A second possibility is that the waiting constraint (i.e.,
participants had to wait as the bet value stepped down in 1 s
intervals) overcame any impulsivity effect. Since on average
participants in this second experiment bet 64% of the available
stake they were forced to wait on average 3.5 s before they could
select their bet. The more impulsive participants had to wait to
place a rational bet. Future studies looking at impulsivity in this
task could choose to lift this constraint by using a different bet
input method. For example, using a slider on the screen to select
the level of the bet the participants would wish to place would
allow themore impulsive participants to place a bet more quickly.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In both experiments a loss-chasing effect was observed
for participants who scored higher in alexithymia. It was
hypothesized that this would be the case since alexithymic
individuals are less sensitive to losses (Ferguson et al., 2009;
Bibby and Ferguson, 2011). A comparison of the size of the loss-
chasing effect for the alexithymics between the two experiments
suggests that it is proportional to the size of the loss. The loss-
chasing effect is small when the loss is small and larger when
the loss is larger. This is a new and interesting observation. For
non-alexithymic individuals when the loss was small there was
no evidence of loss-chasing but when the loss was relatively
large a loss-chasing effect emerged. However, the comparison
between alexithymics and non-alexithymics indicated that the
loss-chasing effect was substantially greater for the alexithymics.
Two possible explanations for why loss-chasing occurs involve
the cognitive demands associated with recouping losses and the
failure of the affect processing systems to successfully process
the emotional consequences of losses. The current experiments
suggest that both these factors are in operation. For both
alexithymic and non-alexithymic participants a financial reward
was only obtained if they scored sufficiently high on the gambling
task. If a substantial loss was made, and in the second experiment
it was, then given that the task was time limited (a fact that was
made clear to all the participants), then the need to maximize
the overall score was important if the monetary reward was to
be achieved. Participants were under greater pressure to recover
from losses in experiment 2, given that the average percentage
bet was 24.0% in experiment 1 and 64.4% in experiment 2 and
therefore the losses were greater. Under such conditions betting
more after a loss is not lacking in rationale. It is a gamble that
could pay off.
Utilizing how losses make you feel is also important. A loss
feels bad. As Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) have pointed out, people
are so intolerant of losses that on average they will not gamble
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 January 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 3
Bibby Loss-Chasing, Alexithymia, and Impulsivity
if there is the possibility of a loss unless the potential gain
is approximately twice the size of the potential loss. However,
if the associated emotional experience of a loss is missing,
misinterpreted or ignored then this bias against making losses
is less likely to be experienced. Taylor et al. (1997) suggest that
alexithymia is not the same as athymia. It is not that alexithymics
do not experience emotions, rather it is the sense making and
processes of affect regulation associated with emotions that is
dysfunctional in alexithymia. In the current task, the negative
emotions associated with a loss are likely to be misinterpreted
or ignored by those high in alexithymia. If this is the case,
then the cognitive to demand to recoup losses will outweigh
the emotional demand to minimize them leading to loss-chasing
which is further exacerbated by the size of the loss. That
it is a deficit in emotion processing that is the problem is
supported by the positive correlations between the emotional
facets of alexithymia, DIF and DDF, and loss-chasing and the
failure to find a correlation between the cognitive component of
alexithymia, EOT.
With respect to gambling, the literature is relatively clear.
Loss-chasing is a key feature of problem gambling. As Lesieur
(1979) has pointed out it is loss-chasing that gets the problem
gambler in trouble in the first place. Having lost money, the
problem gambler bets more to try to win what they have
lost. However, they overbet, leading them to lose more money.
Then they chase this. It should be noted that the loss-chasing
Lesieur discusses is at a grander scale than the loss-chasing
examined in the current research. However, the similarities
between within session and between session loss-chasing should
not be ignored (Breen and Zuckerman, 1999). Furthermore, as
Breen and Zuckerman (1999) argue within session loss chasing
may well lead to between session loss chasing. At the same time
alexithymia is a common feature of problem gamblers. While not
all problem gamblers are alexithymic, alexithymia is more highly
represented in this population than in the normal population.
The findings reported here suggest that it is not a coincidence
that problem gambling and alexithymia coexist. Alexithymics are
more likely to loss-chase which the evidence suggests is more
likely to lead to problem gambling.
The neurological studies reported earlier support the idea
that reduced activity in the emotion centers of the brain is
associated with both alexithymia and loss-chasing. In particular,
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. (2008) suggest that less activity in the
regions associated with managing conflict between cognitive and
emotional systems could be a precursor to loss-chasing. It is these,
and other, regions that been found to show reduced activity in
alexithymics. Damasio and colleagues (Damasio, 1996; Bechara,
1999; Bechara et al., 2005) have demonstrated that injury to
the emotion processing centers of the brain, in particular the
prefrontal cortex, lead to poor decision making in the IGT. The
loss-chasing effect for alexithymics is another example of how
failing to utilize emotional information can lead to poor decision
making.
The current studies only considered two personality variables,
alexithymia and impulsivity when trying to explain loss-chasing
behavior. No doubt there are other personality variables that
are important (e.g., Kim and Lee, 2011). Future studies should
consider including a more complete battery of personality
measures to establish whether alexithymia acts independently
of such personality variables or is either moderated or
mediated by them. Furthermore, at least part of the justification
for conducting these studies was the relationships between
alexithymia and problem gambling and between problem
gambling and loss-chasing. The current studies were conducted
with undergraduate students as participants. They were not
screened for problem gambling. Thus, an important extension
of this work would be to look at problem gamblers. It can be
hypothesized that a specific subgroup of problem gamblers, those
high in alexithymia, are likely to loss-chase more. It may even be
the case that problem gamblers low in alexithymia do not loss-
chase within a gambling session. If they then loss-chase between
gambling sessions it seems likely that this would be explained by
a different mechanism.
A further limitation of the study is that it does not specifically
address the exact mechanism by which a general deficit in
processing emotional information affects participants’ responses
to losses but does not affect participants’ responses to wins.
Previous research (Ferguson et al., 2009; Bibby and Ferguson,
2011) has found a relationship between alexithymia and deficits
in processing losses. However, it is not currently known why this
should happen. However, the earliest descriptions of alexithymia
specifically identified reduced awareness of negative feelings
and emotions as a problem and not positive emotions. Lane
et al. (2000) found a correlation between negative affect and
alexithymia but not positive affect. This could be because that
there is a smaller number of positive rather than negative
emotions typically expressed so it is easier to learn about positive
affect than negative affect when there is a general deficit in
processing emotions. As Taylor et al. (1997) have argued it is
specifically the regulation of the emotions, the making sense of
them, which is important in alexithymia.
Ferguson et al. (2009) suggested that further studies of
decision making in alexithymia should examine other individual
differences. In particular, given that the IGT, and in this case
the CGT, involve risky decision making impulsivity should be
considered. Experiment 1 demonstrated that alexithymia was
associated with loss-chasing and experiment 2 incorporated
impulsivity as possible contributor to loss-chasing. The results,
however, suggest that impulsivity is not directly related to loss-
chasing. Breen and Zuckerman (1999) reported a similar failure
to find an association between impulsivity and loss-chasing. This
is not to suggest that impulsivity is not associated with problem
gambling, rather, it is not associated with one aspect of problem
gambling, that is, loss-chasing.
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